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concerns on security and safety in the workplace due to the events
of September 11, 2001. Both employees and managers are
increasingly willing to sacrifice accustomed niceties for this
1
enhanced protection. Since September 11, sales of Internet and email monitoring software have risen dramatically. Many employers,
who did not do so in the past, now require employees to carry
identification badges. Fire and evacuation drills are conducted
more frequently. Employers are focusing on learning as much
information about employees as possible in the name of safety.
These new concerns, while warranted by the events of September
11, raise many issues under applicable employment laws.
The influx in the need for information begs the question: how
much is too much before the employer’s need for security infringes
on the employee’s privacy? Employee monitoring has positive and
negative consequences. Although monitoring can lead to greater
efficiency and better quality control, and possibly decrease the
employer’s liability for employee misconduct, it can trigger
employee backlash and decrease morale. Further, it may lead to
2
union organizing.
This article explores emerging questions
relating to the needs of employers and employees by examining the
current and future state of privacy in the private workplace.
II. HOW FAR CAN AN EMPLOYER GO TO VERIFY CONDUCT AT W ORK?
Employee monitoring is not a new concept. Employers have
always monitored their employees for reasons of efficiency,
3
security, or legal obligation. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
4
1964, as amended, as well as a myriad of other state and federal
laws, impose an obligation on employers to monitor the workplace
to ensure the workplace is harassment-free. An employer’s
communication systems are generally considered part of the
workplace since employees use them during working time on
working premises.
Improved technology enables employers to dramatically
increase the extent and ability to monitor employee activities. As
1. Security is not solely limited to physical safety but also includes
safeguarding employees’ private information. An employer’s security interest is in
the protection of its proprietary information as well as the privacy of its employees.
2. John B. Lewis, I Know What You E-Mailed Last Summer, SECURITY M GMT, Jan.
2002, at 93.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 to -3 (2002).
4. Id. § 2000e.
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businesses rely more and more on electronic mail (“e-mail”) and
other electronic communications, such as voicemail and mobile
5
phones, employers have many new outlets to monitor employees.
6
A 2001 report by the Privacy Foundation stated that fourteen
million employees, just over one-third of the online workforce in
this country, had their e-mail or Internet usage continuously
7
monitored at work. This increase has raised questions as to how
far employers can go to check employee communications.
A. What are the Privacy Rights of the Private Employee? Employer?
The United States Constitution has been interpreted to
protect privacy rights, but has not been applied to the private
workplace. A right to privacy, although not provided for in the
explicit language of the Constitution, has been interpreted by the
Supreme Court to fall under the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth
Amendment protects against unlawful searches and seizures and
applies to federal, state and local government employees, where
8
employers conducted the searches. The Supreme Court, in
O’Connor v. Ortega, held that in an invasion of privacy suit, the
public sector employee’s privacy interest must be balanced against
9
the “realities of the workplace.” However, absent state action,
employees of private companies do not receive the Fourth

5. Businesses are not alone in their use and reliance on e-mail. E-mail and
its facility to communicate have penetrated the judicial system. The Ninth Circuit
recently held that a lawsuit was properly served when it was sent via e-mail. See Rio
Prop. Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2002).
6. The Privacy Foundation is a privacy interest group. For more information
on the foundation see its website at http://www.privacyfoundation.org.
7. ARTHUR SCHULMAN, THE EXTENT OF SYSTEMATIC M ONITORING OF EMPLOYEE
E-MAIL AND INTERNET USE , PRIVACY FOUNDATION REPORT, at
http://www.privacyfoundation.org/privacywatch/report.asp?id=72&action=0 (July
9, 2001).
8. Not all agree that the extent of coverage of the Fourth Amendment stops
at the public sphere. Judge James M. Rosenbaum, the Chief Judge of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Minnesota has expressed that the Fourth
Amendment “embodies a higher principle,” that “an individual retains a certain
sphere of privacy that is inviolate.” Megan Santosus, Hard Drives Raise Hard Issues,
DARWIN, Jan. 2002, at 18, at
http://www.darwinmag.com/read/010102/buzz_privacy.html (quoting James M.
Rosenbaum, In Defense of the Hard Drive, 4 GREENBAG 169, 170 (2001), available at
http://www.greenbag.org/rosenbaum_harddrive.pdf). Judge Rosenbaum opined
that the private sector should also be covered by the Fourth Amendment’s “higher
principle.” Id.
9. 480 U.S. 709, 721 (1987).
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10

Amendment protection granted to their public counterparts.
In the private realm, the employer’s interests in, for example,
safety, liability for employees’ actions, and prevention of theft and
intellectual property are weighed against the individual’s right to
privacy. The lower an employee’s expectation of privacy, the
greater the likelihood that the employer does not invade the
privacy of the employee when conducting searches or monitoring.
The trend in workplace privacy before September 11 was shifting
toward employees’ interests; however, employees have become less
resistant to monitoring since September 11. It now seems that an
employer is best protected if it announces its policies regarding
employee monitoring and workplace privacy. If an employer does
not have a policy in place, the employee may still derive protection
under common law and federal and state statutes.
B. Common Law Tort Actions
Employers who access their employee’s workplace e-mail
without a clear electronic communication policy may be inviting
claims under state common law for invasion of privacy. Most states
have a common law tort claim for privacy, but not all states
recognize all types of claims. There are four common law theories
to bring a claim for invasion of privacy: (1) “intrusion upon the
seclusion of another,” (2) “appropriation of the other’s name or
likeness,” (3) public disclosure of “private life” facts, and (4)
11
“publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light.” As a
general matter, an employer can avoid liability under the first three
theories if it does not disclose the information reaped from the
monitoring of its employees, and does not continue listening in
when the conversation turns personal.
In New York, for example, courts have declined to recognize a
12
common law right of privacy. The New York Court of Appeals
stated, “[w]e have in the past recognized that, in this State, there is
no common law right of privacy and the only available remedy is
13
that created by Civil Rights Law §§ 50 and 51.” In its place, some
10. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (holding that
individuals are protected against unauthorized interception of their telephone
communications by the government).
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).
12. Hurwitz v. United States, 884 F.2d 684, 685 (2d Cir. 1989) (stating “[n]o
so-called common law right of privacy exists in New York”).
13. Freihofer v. Hearst Corp., 480 N.E.2d 349, 353 (N.Y. 1985). Civil Rights
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employees turn to the tort theory of defamation to bring claims
14
against employers.
However, this theory is concerned with
publication rather than with the monitoring or recording of
telephone or electronic communication.
With the exception of New York, the most prevalent privacy
theory an employee invokes when their e-mail or voicemail was
15
monitored is intrusion upon seclusion.
When deciding an
intrusion upon seclusion claim, courts will consider: (1) whether
the intrusion was intentional, (2) whether the act in question
would have been highly offensive to the average reasonable person,
(3) whether the plaintiff’s activity was subjectively and objectively
private, and (4) whether the intruder had a legitimate purpose
16
justifying the invasion.
The courts, interested in protecting
employers’ ability to conduct their business, have set a “highly
offensive standard,” a high bar for employees to meet.
In McLaren v. Microsoft, the Texas Court of Appeals held that
the employer’s “breaking into” personal folders maintained on the
employee’s office computer which were protected by a password,
17
did not amount to a “highly offensive” invasion of privacy. The
court further held that the employee’s use of a personal password
did not create a reasonable expectation of privacy, which would
prohibit the employer from reviewing the message as part of an
18
investigation into workplace harassment.
Employees may also seek redress under a claim for wrongful

Law § 50 protects an employee’s right to privacy if the employer uses for
advertising purposes or for trade, the “name, portrait, or picture of any living
person without having first obtained written consent of such person.” N.Y. CIV.
RIGHTS L. § 50 (2002). Civil Rights Law § 51 states that the violation of § 50 is a
misdemeanor and further grants the employee a cause of action for injunction
and damages. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS L. § 51 (2002).
14. An employee may bring a claim of defamation if the employer has,
without an applicable privilege, communicated something false and defamatory
about the employee. If the statement communicated is true, the employer has an
absolute defense to defamation claims, but may be held accountable on other
invasion of privacy based claims. See Lewis, supra note 2 (citing Lian v. Sedgwick
James, 992 F. Supp. 644 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (providing more information on claims of
defamation, emotional distress, and intentional infliction of emotional distress));
see also Sarah DiLuzio, Workplace E-Mail: It’s Not as Private as You Might Think, 25
DEL . J. CORP. L. 741, 750 (2000).
15. See Amanda Richman, Restoring the Balance: Employer Liability and Employee
Privacy, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1337, 1352 (2001); see also Lewis, supra note 2, at 93.
16. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
17. No. 05-97-00824-CV, 1999 WL 339015, at *5 (Tex. App. May 28, 1999).
18. Id. at *12-*13.
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termination under tort law. In Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., an at-will
employee claimed he was wrongfully discharged. The employee
allegedly sent inappropriate e-mails to his supervisors over the
20
company’s e-mail system.
The employee argued that the
employer’s interception of these e-mails was an invasion of his
privacy since the employer repeatedly told its employees that the
21
communications over the e-mail system would be confidential.
The court concluded that there was no privacy interest implicated
in the employee’s message to his supervisor and that the
employer’s interest in maintaining professional and appropriate e22
mail protocols outweighed the employee’s privacy interest. The
court also noted that to establish a violation of public policy, the
employee must show that the employer’s actions were a “substantial
23
and highly offensive invasion of” the employee’s privacy.
24
However, in Restuccia v. Burk Technology, Inc., the court, in
partially denying the employer’s motion for summary judgment,
reached a different conclusion. In that case, the employer did not
have in place a policy regarding use of its e-mail system for personal
25
use, but did prohibit “excessive chatting.”
Moreover, the
plaintiffs, as employees, were not specifically informed that their
supervisors had access to computer files and e-mail messages, and
that this information was automatically saved on backup files which
the supervisors could access. The plaintiffs’ supervisor read their email files after hearing that the employees were spending a large
amount of time on the e-mail. Among these e-mails were personal
correspondence and messages sent back and forth between the two
employees regarding one of the plaintiffs’ extra-marital affairs with
26
another employee.
The employees were discharged. The
employer claimed that they were dismissed for excessive use of email and not for its content. The employees brought claims for
wrongful termination, invasion of privacy, unlawful interception of
wire communications, intentional and negligent infliction of
emotional distress, loss of consortium and interference with
19. 914 F. Supp. 97, 98 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
20. Id. at 98-99.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 101.
23. Id. In Smyth, the court held that a reasonable person would not find that
the employer’s actions met this standard. Id. at 101.
24. No. CA 95-2125, 1996 WL 1329386, at *1 (Mass. Supp. Aug. 13, 1996).
25. Id.
26. Id. at *3.
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27

contractual relations. The court granted summary judgment for
the employer on the intentional infliction of emotional distress and
tortious interference with contract claims, but denied summary
judgment on the employees’ wrongful termination claim. The
court held that there was still a genuine issue of material fact on
the issue of “whether [the employees] had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their e-mail messages and whether [the
employer’s] reading of the e-mail messages constituted an
unreasonable, substantial or serious interference with plaintiff’s
28
privacy.”
C. Federal Statutes and Judicial Interpretation
Common law tort actions only grant private sector employees
and employers one mode of protection. The groundwork for
electronic privacy law comes from federal statutes. There are a
variety of federal statutes that apply to workplace monitoring and
protection of privacy in the private sector with the purpose of
curbing employers’ powers to delve into employee
communications. Nevertheless, most courts are sensitive to
employers when interpreting the statutes and find that there is not
enough of an employee privacy interest to warrant protection when
balanced against the employer’s business interests. Relevant
statutes include the Federal Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
29
Streets Act of 1968, the Electronic Communication Privacy Act of
30
1986 (“ECPA”)
and the Stored Wire and Electronic
31
Communications and Transactional Records Access. Although
not specifically targeting workplace monitoring, these Acts have
32
been applied to this area.
The Uniting and Strengthening
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (2000) (amended by Homeland Security Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135).
30. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000) (amended by Homeland Security Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135).
31. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711 (2000) (amended by Homeland Security Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135).
32. Besides these existing Acts, legislation has been proposed to focus more
narrowly on the issue of workplace monitoring. In July of 2000, the Notice of
Electronic Monitoring Act (“NEMA”) was introduced in the House and the
Senate. Nathan Watson, The Private Workplace and the Proposed “Notice of Electronic
Monitoring Act”: Is “Notice” Enough?, 54 IND. FED . COMM. L. J. 79, 80 (2001). The
Act mandated employers to notify their employees before conducting surveillance
of their employees’ communications. Id. This notification was to include the type
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America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, commonly known by its acronym
33
the “USA PATRIOT Act,” may also have an effect on the private
sector workplace.
The Federal Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
34
1968, known as the “Federal Wiretapping Act,” provides for a civil
cause of action against those who intercept wire, oral or electronic
35
communication without the consent of a party. A party’s consent
36
can be expressed or implied, however, and the statute excludes
37
interceptions by employers in the ordinary course of business.
The Act also provides for the recovery of compensatory and
38
punitive damages as well as attorneys’ fees.
39
The Electronic Communication Privacy Act of 1986 (“ECPA”)
40
amended the Omnibus Crime Control Act. Although noted for
41
its lack of clarity, the Act lays out certain prohibitions and
guidelines. Title I of the ECPA, like its predecessor, prohibits an
employer from intentionally intercepting its employees’ wire, oral
42
or electronic communications. Title II of the ECPA prohibits
43
unauthorized “access” to stored communications.
The Acts
provide an additional exception for the use of “telephone
extensions or monitoring equipment, supplied as part of the
of monitoring to take place, the kind of communication to be monitored, the type
of information sought and obtained, the intended use of the information
gathered, and the frequency that monitoring would be conducted. Id. However,
NEMA was not passed and it seems that with the current state of affairs and
attitudes, a similar bill will not be proposed for some time. For more information
on NEMA, see id. at 79 (discussing NEMA and arguing why the proposed
legislation should be reintroduced).
33. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
34. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (2000).
35. Id. § 2520(a).
36. For example, consent may be implied where a party knows that telephone
calls will be intercepted. Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 116 (1st Cir. 1990).
37. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (2000).
38. Id. §§ 2520(b)(1), (2) (2000).
39. Id. § 2510 (2000).
40. Id.; see also S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 1 (1986) reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3555, 3555.
41. See United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing
Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 462 (5th Cir.
1994) (stating that the Wiretap Act “is famous (if not infamous) for its lack of
clarity”)).
42. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (2000). The ECPA amended the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 to prevent against unlawful
interception of electronic communications. See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 1.
43. 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2000).
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original communications system that are used in the ordinary
44
course of business.”
In sum, there are three pertinent exceptions under the
45
“Federal Wiretapping Acts.” The first exception is for e-mail
service providers, the “provider exception.” The provider
exception authorizes access to those providing wire or electronic
46
communications services.
Hence, if a company provides
employees with e-mail use from a company-owned system it should
be covered by this exception. The second exception is for access
47
accomplished in the “ordinary course of business.” Under this
exception, if an employer can justify the monitoring of its
employees’ communications with a business purpose, it should not
be liable under the Act. The last exception is the consent
48
exception. Consent from one party is all that is needed, but it
must be explicit. Some courts choose not to infer consent, but will
49
find consent when it is apparent.
Thus, under this third
exception, employers may escape liability under the Act by giving
clear notice to employees of an employee monitoring policy.

44. Id. § 2510(5)(a) (2000).
45. For more analysis, see DiLuzio, supra note 14.
46. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i) (2000).
47. The ordinary course of business exception for telephones is set forth in §
2510(5)(a) of the ECPA:
(5) “electronic, mechanical, or other device” means any device or
apparatus which can be used to intercept a wire, oral or electronic
communication other than –
(a) any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or facility, or
any component thereof,
(i) furnished to the subscriber or user by a provider of wire or
electronic communication service in the ordinary course of its business
and being used by the subscriber or user in the ordinary course of its
business or furnished by such subscriber or user for connection to the
facilities of such service and used in the ordinary course of its
business; . . . .
Id. § 2510(5)(a).
48. Id. § 2511(2)(d).
49. See Deal v. Spears, 980 F.2d 1153, 1157 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that
implied consent could not be found since the employer did not inform the
employee that it was definitely monitoring the phone but only said that it might
monitor in an effort to “cut down on personal calls”).
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1. Application of Federal Statutes to Reviewing E-mail, Voicemail
and the Internet
As noted above, the ECPA regulates the monitoring of
electronic communications, including e-mail and voicemail. The
statute includes several exceptions (as noted above). Court
decisions involving monitoring employee e-mail have balanced the
employer’s legitimate business needs against the employee’s privacy
50
expectation. Under the exception to the ECPA, it appears that
the employer can escape liability under the Act if the employee
continues to use the e-mail system after being given adequate
notice of an employee monitoring policy.
51
Courts, including New York state courts, have held that the
ECPA applies when the e-mail is intercepted at the point of
52
transmission. The Wiretap Acts thus “provide protection for
communication only while it is in the course of transmission. The
strong expectation of privacy with respect to communication in the
50. See Smith v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97, 101 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (finding
that “the company’s interest in preventing inappropriate and unprofessional
comments or even illegal activity over its e-mail system outweighs any privacy
interest the employee may have in those comments”).
51. See, e.g., Hudson v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 283 A.D.2d 246, 247 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2001) (reinstating the plaintiff’s cause of action alleging that his employer
learned about his affair by intercepting his e-mail, because “although the statute
prohibits only intercepts that are contemporaneous with transmission, i.e., the
intercepted communication must be in transit, not in storage, an allegation that
there was an intercept is sufficient for pleading purposes”) (citation omitted).
52. See Eagle Inv. Sys. Corp. v. Einar Tamm, 146 F. Supp. 2d 105, 112 (D.
Mass. 2001) (holding that the ECPA did not eliminate the “during-transmission
requirement” from the Wiretap Act and noting that if Congress had intended the
definition of “electronic communication” to include both transfer and storage, it
easily could have included the word “storage” in the definition); Steve Jackson
Games Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 461-62 (5th Cir. 1994)
(stating that “Congress’ use of the word ‘transfer’ in the definition of ‘electronic
communication’ and its omission in that definition of the phrase ‘any electronic
storage of such communication’ (part of the definition of ‘wire communication’)”
reflects that Congress did not intend for “intercept” to apply to communications
in “electronic storage”). However, in Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 236 F.3d
1035, 1044 (9th Cir. 2001), opinion withdrawn, 262 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2001), the
Ninth Circuit rejected the Fifth Circuit’s limitation to in “transit” e-mails. The
court stated, “[a]n electronic communication in storage is no more or less private
than an electronic communication in transmission. Distinguishing between the
two for purposes of protection from interception is ‘irrational’ and ‘an
insupportable result given Congress’ emphasis of individual privacy rights during
passage of the ECPA.’” Id. at 1045 (citations omitted). Nevertheless, the court
withdrew its opinion and changed its mind in holding that interception must be
done during “transmissions,” and “not while it is in electronic storage.” Konop v.
Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 878 (9th Cir. 2002).
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course of transmission significantly diminishes once transmission is
53
complete.” Thus, these Acts do not expressly prohibit employers
54
from retrieving stored e-mail and recording video without audio.
55
In Fraser v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., the court analyzed the
workings of e-mail and held that review of an employee’s e-mail
from a file server may be “ethically ‘questionable’” but “not legally
56
actionable under” federal statutes.
However, federal protection still exists for employees
regarding the distribution of information gathered from storage
and file servers. Once the employer has accessed recorded
messages, the law limits their disclosure and prohibits certain
unauthorized disclosures. However, the employer may disclose a
message to an addressee, an intended recipient, or to an agent of
that person. The employer may also disclose the contents of stored
messages with the lawful consent of the originator, addressee, or
intended recipient.
57
The USA PATRIOT Act gives law enforcement more power to
facilitate the investigation of suspected terrorists. It is unclear how
this will affect private sector employment. It is expected that the
Act will further curtail the private rights of private sector employees
because it gives the government increased power to surreptitiously
obtain information. The Act makes it easier for the government to
check individual’s voicemail and e-mail. Whereas before the USA
PATRIOT Act the government needed a wiretap warrant that was
58
often difficult to obtain, now a simple search warrant may do.

53. Fraser v. Nationwide Mutual Ins., 135 F. Supp. 2d 623, 637-38 (E.D. Pa.
2001) (holding that the employer did not violate the ECPA by accessing stored email on its system after the e-mail was received by the named recipients).
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit in Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 878
(2002), stated in dicta that since Congress amended the Wiretap Act, see USA
PATRIOT Act §209, 115 Stat. at 283, “to eliminate storage from the definition of
wire communication,” that once transmission is complete there is no longer an
issue for protection. Id. at 879.
54. In an analogous criminal case, United States v. Simons, 29 F. Supp. 2d
324, 329 (E.D. Va. 1998), the court found that there was no violation of the ECPA
since the e-mail in question was copied from storage and not while it was being
transferred. In Thompson v. Johnson County Cmty. Coll., 930 F. Supp. 501, 50106 (D. Kan. 1996), the court held that the employer had not violated the ECPA
when it installed a video only surveillance camera in the school’s security
personnel changing room after reported thefts had transpired.
55. 135 F. Supp. 2d 623 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
56. Id. at 637-38.
57. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
58. See USA PATRIOT Act § 213 (providing for delays of notice of warrants).
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The Act allows companies to alert and involve government agencies
if an employee is using electronic communications for
59
“unauthorized use.” The government, and possibly employers
who comply with proper government requests under the Act, can
bypass some security safeguards to view a myriad of personal
information about employees. Thus, with a new interest in
detecting threats not only to the company in question but also to
the general public, employers may have even more flexibility in
reviewing office communications. As Attorney General John
60
Ashcroft heralded, “prevention is predicated on information.”
Much public sentiment supports the Attorney General, and many
welcome increased security in exchange for the loss of some aspects
61
of privacy. Further, Congress is contemplating giving employers
in some industries access to FBI databases of arrests, convictions
62
and other suspect lists.
In addition to concerns regarding office e-mail and voicemail,
employers are concerned about employee abuse of the Internet.
Inappropriate use of the Internet is an important issue for many
companies. In certain circumstances, if employees misuse the
Internet, employers may be found liable. Moreover, misuse of the
Internet may create a hostile work environment, divert the
attention of a company’s workforce, and diminish productivity and
morale. Misuse by employees of the “Web” has caused a surge in
the field of employee Internet management (“EIM”). At a recent
conference, one research firm estimated that the market for EIM
63
will approach $750 million by the year 2005. Use of the Internet
in the workplace also raises issues regarding employee privacy
64
rights. Most of the concerns about privacy and the Internet focus
59. Id. §§ 210, 212 (expanding government access to records which can be
sought without a court order); see also James Heaphey, Privacy Not Priority where
Workplace Security is Concerned, DAILY PRESS, Nov. 19, 2001, at C6.
60. Ann Davis, How September 11 Changed America: Are We Safer Now Than Before
Terror Attacks, MSNBC, available at
http://www.msnbc.comm/news/721031.asp?pne=msn (March 8, 2002).
61. However, many do not agree with the Attorney General. Some privacy
advocates argue that increased security measures and methods directly infringe
upon citizens’ civil liberties. See ACLU, at
http://www.aclu.org/privacy/privacymain.cfm; see also Privacy Foundation, at
http://www.privacyfoundation.org.
62. Davis, supra note 60.
63. Emerging Web Content and Employee Internet Misuse Continue to Drive Market
for EIM Software, BUSINESS WIRE, Feb. 20, 2002 at 1.
64. For more information regarding the Internet and privacy rights, see
Shawn C. Helms, Translating Privacy Values with Technology, 7 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L.
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on the use of data collection and information stored or used
65
without an individual’s consent. This concern is not limited to
66
the workplace but is at the forefront of litigation on this matter.
In In re DoubleClick, Inc. Privacy Litigation, the court held that
67
the use of “cookies” to access communications between an
Internet user and Web sites visited while on-line did not violate the
68
ECPA or the Wiretap Act. The class action was filed by users of
the World Wide Web, alleging that DoubleClick and its affiliated
web sites collected personal information (names, e-mail addresses,
telephone numbers, home and business addresses, previous web
sites visited and previous searches on Internet), which users would
not ordinarily expect advertisers to be able to collect without
69
authorized access, in violation of several federal privacy acts. The
court held that DoubleClick’s actions fell under an exception to
70
the ECPA or outside of the statute’s purview since Defendant

288 (2001) (discussing anonymity and the Internet); see also Rachel K.
Zimmerman, The Way the “Cookies” Crumble: Internet Privacy and Data Protection in the
Twenty-First Century, 4 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’ Y 439 (2000-2001); Paul M.
Schwartz, Beyond Lessig’s Code for Internet Privacy; Cyberspace Filters, Privacy-Control,
and Fair Information Practices, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 743 (2000).
65. For a striking view into just how much information can be gathered about
a user when surfing the Internet, visit http://www.privacy.net.
66. See, e.g., Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585,
597 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that Internet user who downloaded supplier’s
software from website maintained by an unrelated site operator did not assent to
licensing agreement not mentioned on unrelated site); see also Supnick v.
Amazon.com, Inc., No. C00-0221P, 2000 WL 1603820, at *1 (W.D. Wash. May 18,
2000) (allowing for class action suit against software users for software that enables
them to intercept and access Internet users’ personal information).
67. “Cookies are computer programs commonly used by Web sites to store
useful information such as usernames, passwords, and preferences, making it
easier for users to access Web pages in an efficient manner.” In re Doubleclick,
Inc. Privacy Litigation, 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 502-03 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
68. Id. at 514, 519 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701(c)(2), 2511(2)(d) (1994)).
69. 154 F. Supp. 2d at 503. Defendant was able to reap this personal
information by using “cookies” placed or already in existence on Plaintiffs’
computers. Id.
70. The statute states that it is not an offense to intentionally access without
authorization, a facility through which an electronic information service is
provided or to intentionally exceed an authorization to access that facility, and
thereby obtain access to a wire or electronic communication while it is in
electronic storage in a system if the conduct is authorized “by a user of that [wire
or electronic communication] service with respect to a communication of or
intended for that user.” Id. at 507 (quoting 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701 (a), (c) (1994)).
Congress subsequently the statute amended by the USA PATRIOT Act §209, 115
Stat. at 283, and eliminated storage from the definition of wire communication.
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provided the service and the users freely used its service. Further,
the court held that Defendant’s actions did not violate the Wiretap
Act because they fell under the consent exception: the Plaintiffs
freely used Defendant’s service, Defendant’s affiliates consented to
the use of this information and Plaintiffs could not show that the
72
Defendant’s acts were done for criminal or tortious purposes.
2. Application of Federal Statutes to Telephone and Cellular
Phone Surveillance
Employers who have traditionally relied on supervisors to
monitor employee performance are increasingly using technology,
such as telephone monitoring, to track employee workplace
operations and communications. In some industries, such as
catalogue sales and telemarketing, listening to an employee’s
telephone conversations enables the employer to accurately assess
the employee’s contact with clients and the public. In these
industries, employees understand that they may be monitored.
However, in other industries an unstated presumption of employee
privacy exists. Many employers, especially following September 11,
surreptitiously monitor telephone calls under the “ordinary course
73
of business” exception to the Federal Wiretapping Act. A general
policy authorizing monitoring does not necessarily establish that
the monitoring of any particular call occurred in the ordinary
course of business. Nor does “the fact that the technology is not
74
eavesdrop-proof . . . in itself defeat any expectation of privacy.”
Rather, each particular monitoring activity must be considered
separately to determine whether it occurred in the ordinary course
of business.
75
For example, in Arias v. Mutual Central Alarm Services, Inc., the
court analyzed whether a central station alarm services company
71. 154 F. Supp. 2d at 513-14.
72. Id. at 519.
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting
under color of law to intercept a[n] . . . electronic communication
where such person is a party to the communication or where one of
the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such
interception unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose
of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States or any State.
18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (1994).
73. See supra note 47.
74. Syposs v. United States, 181 F.R.D. 224, 228 (W.D.N.Y. 1998).
75. 182 F.R.D 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), aff’d 202 F.3d 553 (2d Cir. 2000).
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illegally eavesdropped on employees’ private telephone
conversations. The court stated that the employer could avail itself
of the ordinary course of its business exception.
Here, the defendants’ actions in recording—as
distinguished from listening to—the telephone traffic into
and out of their premises was amply justified by their
legitimate interests in timely provision of emergency
services, ensuring employee fidelity and protecting
themselves against unfounded claims. Given the fact that
alarm signals may be received at any time of the day or
night, those interests could be served adequately only by
the constant recording that was done. Accordingly, this
Court holds that the interceptions—assuming the
interceptions consisted of the recording—were
made in
76
the ordinary course of defendants’ business.
77
Further, in Briggs v. American Air Filter Co., the ordinary course
of business exception applied where a supervisor reasonably
suspected that an employee was disclosing confidential information
to a competitor and had warned the employee of his suspicions.
The court held that the supervisor acted in the ordinary course of
business by listening in while the parties discussed business
78
matters.
79
The exception also applied in Epps v. St. Mary’s Hospital. An
employer overheard a phone conversation in which an employee
berated supervisors. The employer turned on a taping system to
record the remainder of the conversation. The court held the
exception applied because the conversation occurred during office
hours, between co-employees, and concerned scurrilous remarks
80
about supervisors. The court stated, “[c]ertainly the potential
contamination of a working environment is a matter in which the
81
employer has a legal interest.”
Likewise, in Ali v. Douglas Cable Communications, the employer
monitored calls made by its customer service representatives in
82
order to supervise employee training and service. Although the
court found the employer had a legitimate purpose to monitor

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
1996).

182 F.R.D. at 417.
630 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 420.
802 F.2d 412 (11th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 417.
Id.
Ali v. Douglas Cable Communications, 929 F. Supp. 1362, 1373 (D. Kan.
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telephone calls, the court only recognized the legitimate purpose
83
of monitoring business calls, not all calls.
Case law also reflects the exception’s limitations. Notably, in
Deal v. Spears, the exception did not protect a liquor storeowner
who suspected that a recent burglary of the store was an “inside
84
job” involving one of his employees. The employer installed a
device to surreptitiously record all calls made or received at the
store. The plaintiff employee, who was married, was having an
affair with a second plaintiff, who also was married. The employer
recorded about twenty-two hours of calls, many of which included
sexually provocative conversations. The employer was unable to
implicate the plaintiff in the burglary but did learn she sold her
lover a keg of beer at cost, for which she was terminated. The
employer argued that the monitoring came within the exception.
The court disagreed and found the employer had violated the
85
Federal Wiretapping Act by using the recording device.
86
Similarly, in Sanders v. Robert Bosch Corp., the court held that
the exception could not protect an employer when it attached a
“voice logger” to record all phone calls. A security guard employed
by a subcontractor of the company claimed the taping violated the
Federal Wiretapping Act. The court held the taping was not
protected by the exception because the logger was not “a
telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or facility,” and
there was no business justification for “the drastic measure of
87
24-hour a day, 7-day a week recording of telephone calls.”
Business calls generally fall under the exception to the federal
88
wiretapping acts. However, if the employer does not inform the
employee that personal calls will be monitored, those calls may not
be covered. The Eleventh Circuit has held that when an employer
realizes that a call is personal and not business related, the
89
employer must discontinue the monitoring of the call. However,
when an employee has been informed to abstain from making
personal calls, the employee may then assume the risk that his calls
83. Id. at 1380.
84. Deal v. Spears, 980 F.2d 1153, 1158 (8th Cir. 1992).
85. Id. at 1155-58.
86. 38 F.3d 736 (4th Cir. 1994).
87. Id. at 741.
88. Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577, 581-83 (11th Cir. 1983)
(holding that the employee had only consented to monitoring of business sales
calls and not personal calls).
89. Id.
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90

may be monitored.
Originally, courts held that cellular telephone users had “no
91
expectation of privacy in their conversations.” However, when the
ECPA amended the Federal Wiretap Act, cell phones were
included in its web of protection. In the wake of this amendment,
courts have changed their perception on cell phones, holding that
people reasonably expect privacy in their cellular phone
92
conversations.
More recently, courts have continued to apply this rationale.
93
In Bartnicki v. Vopper, the Third Circuit analyzed the federal
statutes described in the preceding section and deciphered
whether the press was liable for broadcasting a cell phone
conversation between a teacher’s union president and the union’s
chief negotiator when the conversation had been intercepted by an
unknown person. The court found that those who had unlawfully
intercepted the conversation violated Title III of the Federal
94
Wiretapping Act.
These federal acts do not preempt state statutes. Individual
state statutes may also apply to private sector employees’ privacy
interests.
D. State Statutes
State legislatures may craft legislation that goes beyond that of
the federal statutes. State laws vary; for example, some mandate
that all parties must consent before monitoring can take place.
In New York, the statutory grants of the right to privacy to
private sector employees are very limited. Under the New York
wiretapping statute, the only clear exception applicable is express
95
or implied consent. Certain other statutes eliminate specified
90. Id.
91. See, e.g., Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705, 706 (8th Cir. 1989).
92. See, e.g., Dunlap v. County of Inyo., 121 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 1997); United
States v. Kim, 803 F. Supp. 352, 362 (D. Haw. 1992). However, this perception
does not necessarily apply for criminal cases. See, e.g., United States v. Perez, 177
F. Supp. 2d 342, 348 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (holding that FBI wiretaps of defendant’s
cellular phone were properly conducted).
93. 200 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 1999).
94. Id. at 125-29. However, the case rose to the Supreme Court, which went
on to assume that the interceptor violated Title III of the Act and held that a
stranger’s illegal conduct does not remove the First Amendment protections for
the press. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 535 (2001).
95. N.Y. PENAL L. § 250.25(1) (1999). See also N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS L. §§ 50-51,
supra note 13.
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methods of observation. For example, the General Business Law
precludes surveillance equipment from being installed in specific
96
areas of business (i.e. bathrooms, fitting rooms, etc.). New York
97
Penal Law prohibits wiretapping.
98
Twenty-eight states have passed laws analogous to the ECPA.
For example, Connecticut law requires that employers who wish to
monitor employees’ communications provide written notice of the
99
types of monitoring that they might perform. Prior written notice
is not required, however, when an employer has reasonable
grounds to believe an employee is engaged in conduct that creates
a hostile work environment, violates the law, or infringes on the
100
legal rights of the employer or other employees. Illinois’ statute
is limited to audible expressions and thus e-mail may not be
101
included.
A Maryland statute covers mail surveillance but
102
requires that the communication be intercepted. Furthermore,
Maryland law requires prior consent of all parties to the
103
communication.
In California, vetoed legislation would have
mandated that an employee receive notice of a policy before an
employer could view the employee’s personal e-mail and computer
104
records. California does extend constitutional privacy protection
105
to private citizens, however. West Virginia enacted a statute in
1999 that bars employers from using any form of electronic
surveillance in areas designed for “the health or personal comfort
of the employees or for safeguarding of their possessions, such as
96. N.Y. GEN. BUS. L. §395-b (McKinney 2002).
97. N.Y. PENAL L. §§ 250.05, 250.25. However, these statutes are not
interpreted to grant a private right of action for their violation. 2 JONATHAN L.
SULDS, NEW YORK EMPLOYMENT LAW, ch. 18-5 (2d ed. 2001) (citations omitted).
98. The states that have passed analogous legislation are: California,
Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
99. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-48d(3)(b)(1) (2001).
100. Id. § 31-48d(3)(b)(2).
101. 720 ILL . COMP. STAT. 5/14-2(d) (1993).
102. M D. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-402 (2002).
103. See State v. McGhee, 447 A.2d 888, 891 n.7 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982).
104. See S. 1016, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999).
105. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1. The California Court of Appeals, in TBG Ins. Serv.
Corp. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 155, 163-64 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2002), held that when an employee has signed a monitoring policy and was
given the use of an office and home computer for work use, and has consented to
an employer’s monitoring policy, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy
under the state’s constitution. Id. at 164.
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rest rooms, shower rooms, locker rooms, dressing rooms, and
106
employee lounges.”
After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, state legislatures
may follow the utilitarian path of Congress and, under a veil of
citizen security, place an entire state’s interest in safety above an
individual’s right to privacy.
III. W HAT COMPANIES ARE IMPLEMENTING AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 AND
HOW THE AMERICAN W ORKPLACE IS IMPACTED
A. New Safety Inquiries
After September 11, companies are instituting new methods of
security. Employers lacking policies regarding office e-mail,
Internet and telephone use are enacting such policies. As
computer software enabling workplace surveillance drops in price
and increases in sophistication, more employers are using
107
electronic means of monitoring. These methods affect not only
108
the workplace as a whole, but also individual employees.
Companies that implemented computer monitoring programs to
search for trigger words that signal potentially sexually harassing emails have now added to the programs words such as
109
“bioterrorism” and “anthrax.” Additionally, some companies are
extending background checks to all employees. While these
methods may create a safer work environment, they must be
carefully analyzed in light of federal and state laws because they
may affect the employees’ rights to privacy.
The multiple requirements of identification badges, fire alarm
drills and emergency routes necessitate the need for employers to
be advised of their employees’ disabilities or impairments.
106.
107.

W. VA. CODE § 21-3-20 (2002).
Melynda Dovel Wilcox, You’re Being Watched, KIPLINGER’ S PERSONAL
FINANCE, Feb. 2002, at 21-22.
108. This article does not directly address the concerns over workplace
environments.
However, the events of September 11 coupled with the
bioterrorism attacks that sent anthrax into American workplaces generate
concerns regarding workplace environment and safety. Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) rules and regulations, 29 U.S.C. § 654 (2002),
grant employers a general duty to provide employees with a safe workplace. How
far employers must go to prevent anthrax or other bioterrorism attacks in the
workplace has not been determined. Employers should reevaluate their security
and safety measures to promote a safe workplace under the circumstances.
109. Wilcox, supra note 107, at 21-22.
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Normally, employers should avoid asking about an individual’s
disability or impairment as it relates to his job duties. The EEOC
ordinarily issues guidance on topics regarding the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”), such as privacy and emergency evacuation
110
procedures. Since September 11, employers must weigh safety
concerns against sensitivity towards personal privacy. Therefore,
employers are more inclined to ask about impairments in the
111
possibility of an emergency and/or evacuation. With safety as the
basis for applying the new requirements, and as long as the level of
privacy expected is made clear, the consensus among many is that
112
employees must abide by the employers’ policies. Some feel that
at a minimum this applies to an employee’s age and ethnicity.
Because age and race are protected categories under the antidiscrimination laws, amassing a database with this information,
even if done under the veil of “safety,” may trigger more civil rights
litigation if followed by adverse employment actions.
Technology has had a monumental effect upon our ability to
store information. Personal information, such as that derived from
background checks, which was once filed or stored in cabinets, can
now be condensed and easily transferred to a disk or e-mail file or
stored on a hard drive or network. Digital storage has also made
113
the process of searching cheaper.
The ease with which
information can now be sought, gathered, and received was at one
114
time unfathomable.
Post-9/11, employers are using the new technology to
115
determine who exactly is in their workplace. Background check
companies state that there is a great influx in the use of such

110.
111.
112.

42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(b)(5)(A), (d) (1990).
See 16 EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION REPORTER, Dec. 11, 2001, at 10.
Carrie Johnson, Life in Cyberspace; Loss of Privacy Could be Price of Security,
NEWSDAY, Nov. 21, 2001, at C02. One attorney cited in the article stated that if an
employee can show that the information required on a mandatory identification
badge is “a cover for another kind of information” in a protected category such as
age or ethnicity, then the employee may be able to make a discrimination claim.
Id.
113. Id.
114. In the past, many databases were not connected. If an employer based in
New York wanted to conduct a search of a potential employee’s criminal record,
he would have to search each state and county database. Now, some companies
have linked databases together to create a more efficient and cost effective search
method. See Lisa Guernsey, What Did You Do Before the War?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22,
2001, at G1.
115. Id.
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116

services as they have changed from a luxury to a necessity. One
spokesperson for a background check company stated that in
October and November 2001, his company had a thirty-three
percent increase in business from employers who were re117
evaluating security.
Background checks that were once used
primarily for screening applicant pools are now used to check
118
current employees. Even with this new surge, the question still
remains: How far can employers delve into an employee’s
background before intruding upon an employee’s (or potential
employee’s) right to privacy?
Under amendments to the Fair Credit Reporting Act
119
(“FCRA”), employers who use “consumer reports” must meet
stringent standards for disclosure and consent. To fall within the
scope of the FCRA, a report must be prepared by a “consumer
reporting agency,” a business that is regularly paid to gather and
120
report information on consumers for third parties. Before an
employer obtains a report on an existing employee or a job
121
applicant, the employer must notify the individual in writing.
Further, the employer must obtain written authorization from the
employee or applicant before the background check can take
122
place. Moreover, specific requirements govern adverse action by
123
the employer based on information discovered in the report. If
the employer is going to use the report in his decision not to hire,
the employer must provide the potential employee with a copy of
the report accompanied by a statement of the prospective
124
employee’s rights.
Employers, however, may not use the
information revealed in the report as a basis for refusal to hire
unless the nature of the offense would create an “unreasonable
125
risk” to property or safety in the work environment.
Some argue an increase in background checks will not create
safer work environments.
One commentator opined that
sophisticated criminals will use the technology to stay ahead of
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Christopher A. Weals, Workplace Privacy, The Tide Has Turned, Opening the
Door for Employers to Snoop – and More, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 4, 2002, at 27.
119. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1997).
120. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(p).
121. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(a).
122. Id. § 1681b(b)(2)(b).
123. Id. § 1681b(b)(3).
124. Id.
125. See N.Y. CORRECT. L. § 752.
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investigators, and pointed out that the hijackers of the planes
crashed on September 11 did not buy homes, cars, or apply for
126
loans, which would have created a residual electronic trail. As
extensive searches increase and employees assert their privacy
rights, the clash between the competing interests will continue.
B. What is the Best Way to Inform Your Employees of
Your Company’s Policy?
To reduce the risk of claims, companies may benefit from
having a clear electronic communication policy. An employer may
not provide sufficient notice by simply stating that ownership of
office property allows the employer unfettered discretion to search
electronic communications at any time. A clearly presented policy
informs employees: (1) that their modes of electronic
communication, such as office computers and phones (including
cell phones), cannot be misused for unprofessional and/or
inappropriate communications; (2) what constitutes unprofessional
or inappropriate misuse; (3) that the electronic devices are the
property of the company; and (4) that employees should not have
any expectation of privacy in the use of these devices or the
communications they exchange. Moreover, the policy should
inform employees of the possible legal consequences of electronic
communications. A policy that encompasses these specifications
127
has been highly regarded by the judiciary.
Employers should consider many different factors when
creating an electronic communication policy. The policy should
state who will have access to the information viewed, the purpose of
the use, those to whom the information may be disclosed, and that
the information may be stored on a separate computer.
Unauthorized use by employees may be deterred if they also are
placed on notice of the repercussions of misuse. This includes a
warning stating that no employee should use e-mail for
communications containing racial slurs, sexual harassment, or
other inappropriate comments. Knowing that a supervisor could
view e-mail correspondence with other employees may deter an
employee from discussing inappropriate topics. This would not

126. Guernsey, supra note 114.
127. See TBG Ins. Servs. Corp. v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 155, 162
(Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (discussing incentives for, and correct inclusions of, employer
policies on electronic communications).
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only protect the employee, but would also help the employer avoid
liability for the employee’s acts. When drafting policies, employers
should also consider employees’ interests; solely considering the
employer’s business interests may generate policies that fail to
128
address the employee’s privacy concerns.
In summary, an
employer should conceive of appropriate ways to minimize privacy
expectations while being sensitive to the potential impact on
employee morale.
These suggestions do not necessarily apply to all employers.
Nevertheless, employers are encouraged to inform employees that
they are under surveillance at work, and each company should have
a policy tailored to its needs. Furthermore, there are a variety of
ways to notify employees of the company policy. A key requirement
is that the employer obtains some form of consent, whether explicit
or implicit. While a signature page that affirmatively confirms
assent to the company’s policy and provides clear evidence of
consent would be most beneficial, the consent requirement could
be achieved in numerous other ways. Other examples include
mandating employee acknowledgment of receipt of e-mail
messages concerning the company’s policies and notifying
employees via the employee handbook that the company adheres
to a policy by which it reviews employee e-mail.
It is essential that employers take immediate steps to protect
themselves from potential privacy claims. Suggested preventive
measures include establishing a privacy checklist. Such a checklist
includes the following:
• Awareness of Current Law: Stay apprised of the most current
law and its application to your actions;
• Notice: Give applicants and employees notice of intended
monitoring and the method of the intended monitoring;
• Purpose of Monitoring: Ensure that monitoring is directly
related to the purposes and functions of the employee’s job;
• Means of Monitoring: Use reasonable and unobtrusive
means to monitor employees when necessary; and
• Confidentiality: Safeguard the confidentiality of private
information obtained about employees.
128. Jeremy U. Blackowicz, E-mail Disclosure to Third Parties in the Private Sector
Workplace, 7 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 80, 101 (2001). For example, within its
business related interest, an employer may justify reviewing an employee’s
personal e-mail regarding other companies. The employee’s concern focuses on
disclosure of proprietary information contained in her e-mail. See id.
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C. Discovery and the Importance of Data Retention
Occasionally, e-mails are problematic for employers embroiled
129
in sexual harassment and race discrimination cases. Abuses of
company e-mail by employees can lead to the distribution of
130
131
racially charged or sexually harassing e-mails to the entire
company or to a selective group of targeted individuals. In either
case, such e-mails could give rise to a claim of discrimination.
Once legal action commences, the discovery process can create
large obstacles for the employer. The e-mails in question may have
been stored on the system and thus subject the employer to grave
liability if it is forced to disclose the contents of its networks and
databases.
IV. CONCLUSION
The atmosphere of the workplace post-9/11 has changed
dramatically. With the passing of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001,
employee privacy rights in the private workplace are declining now
more than ever. However, this decline does not indicate that
employee privacy rights are not of major concern or a hotly
contested issue. For this reason, employers should establish e-mail
and voicemail policies to protect themselves and ensure efficient
business practices. The implementation of policies can aid in
preventing employer liability on multiple fronts, including liability
for employees who misuse such communication methods and
invasion of privacy claims. In the new workplace, the schism
between privacy and safety may coalesce upon the notion that it is
better to be safe than sorry.

129. For further analysis on the vast liability that e-mail can create for
employers, see Gregory I. Rasin & Joseph P. Moan, Fitting a Square Peg Into a Round
Hole: The Application of Traditional Rules of Law to Modern Technological Advancements
in the Workplace, 66 M O. L. REV. 793, 804-07 (2000).
130. See, e.g., Owens v. Morgan Stanley & Co., No. 96 Civ. 9747, 1997 WL
403454, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 1997) (granting defendant’s motion for summary
judgment while granting plaintiffs the opportunity to file an amended complaint
in a suit by African American employees premised upon, amongst other things, an
allegedly racist e-mail).
131. See, e.g., Strauss v. Microsoft Corp., 856 F. Supp. 821, 821-23 (S.D.N.Y.
1994) (denying defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment in a dispute in
which a female worker alleged that her supervisor’s sexually charged e-mails were
offensive).
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